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DEFINING SUBSTANTIVE CRIMES WITHIN THE
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:

WHAT IS THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION?
Grant M Dawson*

I. INTRODUCTION

The attempt to moderate the excesses of war without controlling
war itselfwas doomed tofailure by the extraordinaryscientific and
industrialdevelopments of the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries.1
A. HistoricalBackground
In the summer of 1999, decades of work by the international community
culminated in the signing of the world's first multilateral treaty to establish
a permanent international criminal court.2 The United Nations Diplomatic

*. B.A. Columbia College 1995; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center 1999; currently
Attorney Advisor to The Honorable Eugene R. Sullivan of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. The author would like to thank both Professor Robert F.
Drinan and The Honorable Eugene R. Sullivan for their helpful suggestions. The opinions
expressed in this Article are the author's own.
1. HenryL. Stimson, The Nuremburg TrialI, Landmark inLaw, 25 FOREIGNAFF. 179, 182
(1947).
2. See generallyTimothy L. Dickinson, Joint Report with Recommendations to the House
ofDelegates:Establishment ofan InternationalCriminalCourt, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L.
& PRAC. 11 8B [hereinafter 1998 Recommendation] (tracing procedural history of the
International Criminal Court) and citing, inter alia, American Bar Association Task Force
on an International Criminal Court and New York State Bar Association, Joint Report with
Recommendations to the House of Delegates: Establishmentof an InternationalCriminal
Court, 27 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter 1992 Recommendation]; James
H. Carter, Report on Improving the Effectiveness ofthe UnitedNations in Advancing the Rule
of Law in the World, Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness ofthe United Nations,
reprintedin 29 INT'L LAW. 293, 300 (Summer 1995) [hereinafter 1994 Recommendation];
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court,
G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995); Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, InternationalCriminalCourtBriefing Series: Establishingan
InternationalCriminalCourt(visited Mar. 23,2000) <http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap l.htm>;
Association Internationale de Droit Penal, The InternationalCriminal Court: Observations
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Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("Rome Statute") 3 with the requisite number of signatories. Senegal became
the first state to ratify the treaty.4
A comprehensive history of the events leading up to the Rome Statute
is contained in Professor M. CherifBassiouni's article The Time Has Come
for an InternationalCriminalCourt.' However, a convenient starting point
for the purposes of this Article is 1948, when the United Nations established
the International Law Commission to be the entity charged with the duty of
codifying and developing international law.6 Part of this responsibility was
the task of examining "the possibility of creating a permanent international
criminal court." 7 The International Law Commission set to work on a draft
statute for a permanent international criminal court, and two drafts were

andIssues Before the 1997-98 PreparatoryCommittee;Human Rights Watch, Commentary
for the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court
(1996); Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, Vols. 1 & 2, U.N. Doe. A/51/22,
para. 6 (1996); Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory
Committee on the Establishmentofan InternationalCriminalCourt,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 177,
186-87 (Jan. 1997); Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its FortySixth Session, Draft Statutefor an InternationalCriminalCourt,49 U.N. GAOR, 49 Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (Sept. 1, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Draft Statute]; Report
of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of itsfifty-eighth session, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996); Decisions Taken by the Preparatory
Committee at Its Session Held From 4 to 15 August 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/
1997/L.8/Rev.1 (Aug. 14, 1997); James Crawford, Current Development, The ILC Adopts a
Statute for an InternationalCriminalCourt, 89 AM. J.INT'L L. 404 (1995) (tracing history
of 1994 Draft Statute).
3. Rn Statute of the Internationa! Criminal Court U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4. Senegal ratified the Rome Statute on February 2, 1999; since then, six other states have
ratified the Rome Statute: Trinidad and Tobago on April 6, 1999; San Marino on May 13,
1999; Italy on July 26, 1999; Fiji on November 29, 1999; Ghana on December 20, 1999; and
Norway on February 16, 2000. Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Rome
Signature & Ratification Chart (last modified Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.igc.org/icc/
rome/html/ratify.html>.
5. Professor Bassiouni has written an intriguing and comprehensive history of the events
leading up to the formation of the ICC. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an
InternationalCriminalCourt, I IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1991) (starting in 1474 in
Breisach, Germany, with the judgment and condemnation of Peter von Hagenbach by a 27judge "panel" of the Holy Roman Empire for violations of the "laws of God and man").
6. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an InternationalCriminal
Court: Major UnresolvedIssues in the DraftStatute, at Introduction (visited Mar. 18, 2000)
<http://www. lchr.org/icc/iccpap 1.htm>.
7. See id.
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actually completed in the 1950s.8 However, the polarization of world politics
resulting from the Cold War hindered further progress.9 On the request of the
United Nations General Assembly, the International Law Commission
submitted a draft statute for an international criminal court in 1993 and a
revised draft statute in 1994.0 Although the revised draft statute suggested
that the General Assembly "convene an international conference of
plenipotentiaries to study the draft statute and to conclude a convention on
the establishment of an international criminal court,"" it instead established
an Ad Hoc Committee that met in April and August of 1995.12 On the Ad
Hoc Committee's recommendation and with the endorsement of the Sixth
Committee, the General Assembly formed the Preparatory Committee, which
met in March and August 1996 to work on the text of the statute. 13 Finally,
member states met in Rome at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
("Rome Conference") to finalize the text of the Draft Statute for an

International Criminal Court ("Draft Statute").' 4 The member states signed
the multilateral treaty on July 17, 1998."5

8. See id.
9. See id.See also Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 12 ("During the cold war (1948-1989)
countries on both sides of the then iron curtain perceived the exigencies of national security
at [sic] precluding consideration of an international criminal court that would deal with such
international crimes as aggression and terrorism. But the real reason was that the two
superpowers engaged in acts violating international criminal law, as did their surrogates,
satellites and respective friendly countries."); Crawford, supranote 3, at 415 (stating that the
end of the Cold War has made the ICC possible); Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the
Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 258 n.25
(1995) (noting that "[w]ithin the context of Cold War politics, consideration of the 1953
Draft Statute was postponed because of disagreement on the definition of the crime of
aggression.... Although a definition was eventually adopted in 1974, it was not until 1989
that the issue of an international criminal jurisdiction was once again included in the agenda
of the General Assembly") (internal quotation marks omitted); Nanette Dumas, Note,
Enforcement ofHuman Rights Standards: An International Human Rights Court and Other
Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp.L. REv. 585, 589-90 (1990) (noting that defining
aggression "became a politically charged Cold War issue").
10. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 6, at Introduction.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court, U. N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Draft
Statute].
15. The head of the United States delegation to the Rome Conference made the following
observation:
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The International Criminal Court ("ICC") "is designed as a treaty-based
court with the unique power to prosecute and sentence individuals, but also
to impose obligations of cooperation upon . . . states" 16 regardless "of
whether they are parties to relevant treaties or have accepted the Court's
jurisdiction with respect to the crime[s] in question."17 One of the core
functions of the ICC is to serve as a forum in which individuals suspected of
committing certain crimes can be tried when individual states are either
unwilling or unable to bring these alleged perpetrators to justice." As a
result, the crimes to be encompassed by the ICC are of crucial importance to
its identity. Prior to the Rome Conference, the Draft Statute listed the core
crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC as the crime of
genocide,' 9 crimes against humanity," war crimes,2' and the crime of
aggression.22 However,
the text of the Rome Statute failed to define the
23

crime of aggression.

Yet it provided that "[t]he Court shall exercise

[I]n the final forty-eight hours of the Rome Conference... [t]he treaty text was
subjected to a mysterious, closed-door and exclusionary process of revision by a
small number of delegates, mostly from the like-minded group, who cut deals to
attract certain wavering governments into supporting a text that was produced at
2:00 A.M. on the final day of the conference, July 17. Even portions of the statute
that had been adopted by the Committee of the Whole were rewritten. This "take
it or leave it" text for a permanent institution of law was not subjected to the
rigorous review of the Drafting Committee or the Committee of the Whole and was
rushed to adoption hours later on the evening of July 17 without debate.
David J. Scheffer, The United States and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 12, 20 (1999).
16. Id. at 18.
17. 1998 Recommendation, supra note 2, at 13. See also Lara A. Ballard, Comment, The
RecognitionandEnforcement oflnternationalCriminalCourt .hudgments in U.S. Courts,29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 163 (1997) (noting that "[sitates parties to the ICC treaty

that have accepted the ICC's jurisdiction with regard to the crime in question must respond
without undue delay to the request, which may be for the disclosure of evidence, the

apprehension of suspects, or another form of judicial or police assistance").
18. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 6, at Introduction.
19. See Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 5(a).
20. See id. art. 5(d).
21. See id. art. 5(c).
22. See id. art. 5(b).
23. The Rome Statute sets forth the crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Court in
the following manner:
Thejurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
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jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to
conditions under
'2
this crime.

1

(d) The crime of aggression.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(2). The Rome Statute goes on to define the crimes under
(a), (b), and (c); however, with respect to (d), the Rome Statute states:
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision
is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting
out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to
this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
24. Id. As a result, jurisdiction over crimes of aggression, whatever that will come to mean
in the future, will not be exercised by the ICC until it is properly defined and approved by
the parties to the Rome Statute. See Carl M. Nesser, Aggression, INT'L CRIM. CT. MONITOR
(visited Mar. 18,2000) <http://www.igc.apc.org/icc/html/monitor I I f.html>. The Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court defined the crime of
aggression in the following manner:

Option I
1. [For the purpose of the present Statute, the crime [of aggression]
[against peace] means any of the following committed by an individual
[who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing
political/military action in a State]:
(a) planning,
(b) preparing,
(c) ordering,
(d) initiating, or
(e) carrying out
[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression,] [a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing] by a State against the
[sovereignty,] territorial integrity [or political independence] of another
State [when this] [armed attack] [use of force] [is] [in contravention of
the Charter of the United Nations] [in contravention of the Charter of the
United Nations as determined by the Security Council]].

Option 2
1. [For the purpose of this Statute, the crime of aggression is committed by a
person who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing
political/military actions in his State, against another State, in contravention to the
Charter of the United Nations, by Resorting to armed force, to threaten or violate
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of that State.]
[2. [Acts constituting [aggression] [armed attack] include the following:] [Provided
that the acts concerned or their consequences are of sufficient gravity, acts
constituting aggression [are] [included] the following:]
(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the
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The delegates at the Rome Conference were unable to decide on a
definition of the crime of aggression and essentially agreed to disagree. The
battle lines were drawn over two competing models on which to base the
definition of the crime of aggression. One model based liability for the crime
of aggression on the individual responsibility model contained within the

territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State [, or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory
of another State];
(c) the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) an attack by the armed forces or [sic] a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) the use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement, or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond
their termination of the agreement;
(f) the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating
an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.]

Option 3
[1. For the purpose of the present Statute [and subject to a determination
by the Security Council referred to in article 10, paragraph 2, regarding
the act of a State], the crime of aggression means either of the following
acts committed by an individual who is in a position of exercising control
or capable of directing the political or military action of a State:
(a) initiating, or
(b) carrying out
an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial integrity or
political independence of another State when this armed attack was
undertaken in [manifest] contravention of the Charter of the United
Nations [with the object or result of establishing a [military] occupation
of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof by armed
forces of the attacking State.]
2. Where an attack under paragraph 1 has been committed, the
(a) planning,
(b) preparing, or
(c) ordering
thereof by an individual who is in a position of exercising control or capable of
directing the political or military actions of a State shall also constitute a crime of
aggression.]
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Working
Group on Definition of Crimes, Draft Consolidated Text: Crime of Aggression, A/AC.249/
1997/WG.I/CRP.6 (Feb. 21, 1997).
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Charter of the International Military Tribunal ("Nuremberg Charter")
fashioned for use by the International Military Tribunal ("Nuremberg
Tribunal") following World War II. The second model simulated General
Assembly Resolution 3314 of 1974 ("Resolution 3314",),26 which placed
responsibility for the crime of aggression with the states themselves. The
delegates also debated whether the United Nations Security Council should
be required to declare that an act of aggression has taken place before the
ICC could assume jurisdiction over the alleged violation.

B. CurrentProceduralBackground
On February 26, 1999, the Preparatory Commission appointed a
coordinator to work on the definition of the crime of aggression and report
back during its next session.27 The Final Act of the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Cour 8 charges the Preparatory Commission to
complete proposals for the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the
Elements of Crimes before June 30, 2000.29 However, the Preparatory
Commission need not finalize a definition of the crime of aggression until the
first meeting of the Assembly of States Parties, which will not occur until
sixty states have ratified the Rome Statute.30 Thus, while the Preparatory
Commission concentrates on proposals for the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and the Elements of Crimes, the signatories to the Rome Statute
can continue to negotiate a definition of the crime of aggression. This Article
is offered to facilitate agreement upon a definition of the crime of aggression,
while at the same time preserving the motivations for the inclusion of the
crime of aggression under the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. This
Article also seeks to take advantage of the lull in the effort to define the
crime of aggression by offering a recommendation that may bridge the gap

25. Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Protocol of 6 October 1945, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
26. G.A. Res. 3314, UNGAOR, 29th Sess., Definition of Aggression, Annex, Definition
of Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/Res./3314 (XXIX)(1974) [hereinafter Resolution 3314].
27. The Preparatory Commission met twice more in 1999: July 26 to August 13 and
November 29 to December 17.
28. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the
Establishmentofan InternationalCriminalCourtDone at Rome on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc.

A/CONF. 183/10 (1998).
29. See Nesser, supra note 24.
30. See id.
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between the practical and theoretical and the political and legal differences
that have thus far blocked adoption of a definition.
Part II discusses the concept of individual responsibility as it was
developed in the Nuremberg Charter and the Nuremberg trial proceedings
and how it can be applied to a definition of the crime of aggression for the
purposes of the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. Part III discusses the
concept of state responsibility as it was developed in Resolution 3314, how
it has been utilized to form the definition of the crime of aggression in the
Draft Statute, and how this definition can be harmonized with the concepts
of individual responsibility discussed in Part II. Part IV discusses the
relationship between the Security Council and the ICC with respect to the
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over "matters" involving acts of
aggression. Part V discusses some problems that arise in connection with the
inclusion of the crime of aggression within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the ICC and offers a recommendation regarding the crime of aggression.
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I. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

If aggression is so wrong that internationallaw calls upon our
youth to die in remote parts of the world to stop it, these innocents
have, I submit, a moral rightto ask, "What willyou do about those
persons guilty of it?,,31
32

A. The Charterof the InternationalMilitary Tribuna
1. Recognition of the Principle of Individual Responsibility

In the aftermath of World War II, the crime of aggression was not simply
regarded as an abstract juridical principle, but rather as "the greatest menace
of our times."33 The Allied powers recognized that the dual goals of
punishing German individuals responsible for the war while bringing

31. WhiTNEY R. HARRs, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE ATNUREMBERG 568 (1954)
(quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson, Representative and Chief Counsel for the United States
of America, speaking before the American Society of International Law).
32. Section 2, Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal puts forth the
jurisdiction and general principles that were to be applied in
the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis
countries.., who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether
as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following
crimes ... for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of
internationaltreaties, agreements or assurances,or participationin a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment
or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment ofprisoners
of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war; or persecution on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, pt. II, art. 6 (emphasis added).
33. Robert H. Jackson, Representative and ChiefCounsel for the United States of America,
Opening Address for the United States of America at the Trial of War Criminals at
Nuremberg (November 21,1945).
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Germany into the fold of Europe were vital for the avoidance of future wars
of aggression.34 Ideally, German economic, social, and political institutions
would become so intricately connected to those of their neighbors that future
Because this visionary strategy
aggression would be unthinkable.
necessitated the imposition of individual liability, the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis ("London Agreement")35 and the Nuremberg Charter36 established the
principle that "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced."37 Moreover, "[tihe
principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects
the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned
as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter
themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from
punishment in appropriate proceedings."3 8 The Nuremberg Charter rests on
the principle that "individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by individual states."3 9
The international war crimes tribunals established for the former
Yugoslavia 4" and Rwanda,41 have reaffirmed the necessity of affixing
individual responsibility to specific individuals. 42 However, the negotiators
at the Rome Conference still had to grapple with the issue of whether
criminal liability for the crime of aggression is an act primarily perpetrated
by an individual or by a state, a debate that was also present over fifty years

34. See id.
35. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America; The Provisional
Government of the French Republic, The Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug.
8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter the London Agreement].
36. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25.
37. NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS

223 (1947).

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 ("ICTY"), S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175 mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
41. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda ("ICTR"), S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
42. Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 112 (1995).
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ago at the negotiations that produced the Nuremberg Charter. The
negotiations preceding the Nuremberg Tribunal were fraught with debates
over what was to be the definition of the crime of aggression and thus who
was to be held accountable through punishment.43 While the United States
preferred a more expansive definition, the Soviet Union sought a more
limited definition that could not be used in relation to its own acts of
aggression.
General I.T. Nikitchenko represented the Soviet Union's delegation to
the negotiations of the London Agreement and the Nuremberg Charter."
Due to the fact that the Soviet Union was itself guilty of aggression against
Finland and Poland, General Nikitchenko maintained that the definition of
the crime of aggression should be vague.45 The American representative was
Justice Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Justice Jackson emphasized that the definition of the crime of
aggression must be a general principle that applied equally to all nations if
the Nuremberg Tribunal was to have any legitimate judicial authority.46
Qualifying the definition to apply only to citizens of the Axis countries would
have deprived the Tribunal "of all standing and fairness as a juridical
principle."4 7 In his report to the U.S. Department of State, Justice Jackson
explained that "launching a war of aggression is a crime and... no political
or economic situation can justify it."48
After much negotiation at the London Conference, the negotiators
reached the following compromise: the general principle was adopted, but
the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal was limited only to the acts of
aggression of the Axis countries.4 9 Thus the state of Germany would not be
put on trial, but rather those German citizens, especially members of the
military, who in their individual capacities had committed specific criminal
acts of aggression. The Nuremberg Charter introduced the crime of
aggression into international law by recognizing that the "Nuremberg
Defendants were accused of subverting German sovereignty to their criminal

43. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 54-55, 65 (1992); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. NO. 3080, REPORT OF ROBERT H.
JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

MILITARY TRIALS

329-47 (1949) [hereinafter

JACKSON REPORT].

44. See JACKSON REPORT, supra note 43, at 382-83.
45. See HARRIS, supra note 3 l,at 525; JACKSON REPORT, supra note

46.
47.
48.
49.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 422.

43, at 330.
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purposes."5 ° In this way, and in many other post-war decisions, the Allied
powers strove to punish those who had personally committed heinous acts in
the name of their countries"' while at the same time not recreating the
missteps of the Treaty of Versailles.52 In order to implement the tough

lessons of World War I, the Allies reached a political compromise by
narrowly tailoring the Nuremberg Tribunal's jurisdiction.

HARRIS, supra note 31, at 494. This commentator continues:
The historic trial at Nuremberg was grounded in the common law of nations. That
common law, as codified in international treaties and conventions, and as
interpreted and applied by scholars and judges, provided its juridical basis.
Correlatively, the trial contributed a powerful new precedent to the growing body
of international law. It was a proceeding conducted by lawyers, and it constitutes
an important step in the long struggle of the legal profession to replace the role of
force by the rule of law. Mr. Justice Jackson said recently that the "conception of
law as a brake on power is one of the chief contributions to civilization made by
our profession." At Nuremberg, for the first time in history, men who had abused
power were held to answer in a court of law for crimes committed in the name of
war.
Id. at 496 (footnote omitted).
51. Only German citizens were tried by the International Military Tribunal; a similar
tribunal was erected for the trials of the defeated Japanese. See HARRIS, supra note 31, at
519. It is interesting to note that Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter provides: "Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons on execution of such plan." Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25,
pt. II, art. 6. See also OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION
OF AxIs CRIMINALITY, 1 NAzI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 5 (1946) [hereinafter
NuxRuERiti RECORD1. This is an eight volume work with two supplements that was
prepared by the Office of the United States Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis
Criminality containing "briefs prepared by members of the prosecution staff of the United
States and the English translations of a very large number of documents, many of which were
not read in full into evidence and therefor appear in complete form only in this set" and
"published in 1946 by the United States Government Printing Office." HARRIS, supranote
31, at xvii-xviii. The ending language of Article 6 contains an element beyond mere
responsibility for the individual acts of the defendant and, in this way, seems to symbolically
punish all Germans collectively. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, pt. II, art. 6.
Furthermore, head of state immunity was abolished, at least for the purposes of the Tribunal.
See id. Article 7 provides: "The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment." Nuremberg Charter, supra note 25, pt. II, art.
7.
52. See NUREMBERG RECORD, supra note 52, at 16-17. Although, following World War
I, an international tribunal was erected in order to try Kaiser Wilhelm for "a supreme offense
against morality and the sanctities of treaties," the trial never took place. See Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, supra note 7, at 1.

50.
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Ironically, the United States took a stance at the Rome Conference very
similar to that of the Soviet Union at the London Conference.53 The
American Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, the leader of the
American delegation to the Rome Conference, has written that "the United
States has special responsibilities and special exposure to political
controversy over [its] actions," a factor that "cannot be taken lightly when
issues of international peace and security are at stake," and that the United
States is "called upon to act, sometimes at great risk, far more than any other
nation."54

One of the most valuable achievements of the Nuremberg Tribunal was
the sure-footed codification it gave to the principle that individual defendants
who had committed acts criminalized by the Nuremberg Charter were not
permitted to displace liability onto their commanders. This principle appears
in three provisions of the Rome Statute: Article 27, "Irrelevance of official
capacity";55 Article 28, "Responsibility of commanders and other
superiors" ; 6 and Article 33, "Superior orders and prescriptions of law."57 In

comparison, Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter provided: "[t]he fact that the

53. James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire,84-Sep A.B.A.J. 64,69(1998) (quoting
Cherif Bassiouni, chair of the drafting committee at the ICC conference, as stating that the
United States did not sign the ICC Statute in large measure because it could not get "a stamp
across the front of the treaty that says this will never apply to the United States, but the
United States can use it whenever it wants"). The United States tried to amend Part 2 of the
Rome Statute providing that "as a condition to the jurisdiction of the court over a specific
alleged crime, either the state in which the crime was committed or the state of nationality
of the accused must be a party to the treaty or have consented to the court's jurisdiction."
The amendment, which required "that the state of the accused consent to the court's
jurisdiction in every case," was rejected. Id. at 66-67.
54. Scheffer, supra note 15, at 12. Scheffer stated to the Senate Foreign Relations
subcommittee:
Our position is clear. Official actions of a nonparty state should not be subject to
the court's jurisdiction if that country does not join the treaty, except by means of
Security Council action under the U.N. Charter. On the practical side, no other
nation matches the extent of the United State's overseas military commitments
through alliances and special missions such as current peacekeeping commitments
in the former Yugoslavia. We don't have the luxury of not considering these
factors. On the legal side, the provisions violate a fundamental principle of
international law that a treaty cannot be applied to a state that is not a party to it.
Statement by David Scheffer, Senior Advisor and Counsel to Ambassador Madeleine K.
Albright, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the
International Criminal Court, in the Sixth Committee, U.S.U.N. Press Rel. #165(96), at 8
(October 31, 1996). For fuller treatment of American opposition to the ICC, see infra Part
IV.C.
55. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 27. See also Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 24.
56. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 28. See also Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 25.
57. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 33. See also Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 32.
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Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall
not free him from responsibility." 58 However, such an order from a superior
was to "be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determine[d that justice so require[d]." 5 9 Thus, if a mere soldier who played
no role in beginning the illegal war of aggression committed acts to further
that war, that soldier might have avoided liability on a charge of aggression.6"
He may still have been subject to other charges; for example, if the soldier
committed actions in furtherance of the war of aggression that can be
classified within the definition of war crimes, then he could have been liable
on that basis for any war crimes committed, but not for aggression.6 1 In
contrast, high level officials would have less probability of having their
criminal liability mitigated because they were the ones directly responsible
for causing the war of aggression.62 With the principle of individual
responsibility firmly in place, the Nuremberg Tribunal could confidently put
defendants on trial for the crime of initiating and/or waging aggressive war,
provided it could determine exactly what it meant to initiate and/or wage
aggressive war.
2. The Definition of Aggressive War
The judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal separated the issues of
aggression and individual responsibility, and aggressive war was subsumed
under the larger heading of crimes against peace. 63 The Nuremberg Tribunal
characterized the waging of an aggressive war as "essentially an evil
thing.... To initiate a war of aggression ... is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole. 64
In addition, conspiracy to initiate and/or wage aggressive war was established

58. NUREMBERG
59. Id.

RECORD,

supra note 51, at 6.

60. See HARRIS, supra note 31, at 530-31, 534 (recording Justice Jackson as stating, "It
never occurred to me, and I am sure it occurred to no one else at the conference table, to

speak of anyone as waging a war except topmost leaders who had some degree of control
over its precipitation and policy").
61. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63. The Tribunal states, "It will be convenient to consider the question of the existence of
a common plan and the question of aggressive war together, and to deal later in thisjudgment
with the question of the individual responsibility of the defendants." NUREMBERG RECORD,
supra note 51, at 16.
64. Id.
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as a cognizable crime, separate from the crime of actually initiating and/or
waging aggressive war.6 5

But, how would a modern-day peacekeeping operation or a military
action taken in self-defense be regarded in light of the Nuremberg Tribunal's
condemnation of aggressive war? 66 The answer to these questions must lie

in the interpretation of the "initiation" of an aggressive war. To use a recent
example, Iraq's annexation of Kuwait would be the initiation of aggressive

war because Kuwait had not provoked Iraq through any military act;
American participation in the United Nations action to expel Iraq from
Kuwait, an act of collective self-defense authorized under Chapter Seven of
the United Nations Charter,67 would be a legally justified reaction to Iraq's
initiation of aggressive war. Similarly, the Nuremberg Tribunal offered an
example of the initiation of aggressive war: "the seizure[s] of Austria and
Czechoslovakia" were acts of aggression and "the war against Poland begun
on the 1st September 1939" was a war of aggression.6 8 However, where the

Security Council refuses to acknowledge an act of aggression, the ICC must

65. See HARRIS, supra note 31, at 555-56.
66. A famous quotation of Marcus Tullius Cicero is applicable here, but not in the context
in which it is usually employed: inter arma enim silent leges (amidst the clash of arms, laws
fall silent (translation of the author)). MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, IN DEFENSE OF TITUS
ANNIUS MILO (53 A.D.). Cicero's statement is almost always quoted out of context, and thus
misconstrued to stand-either descriptively or prescriptively-for the proposition that when
there is a war, the normal administration of justice either is or should be suspended. For
example, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated at the closing ceremony of
the Rome Conference on July 18, 1998, held in a hilltop piazza overlooking the Roman
Forum:
Two millennia ago, one of this city's most famous sons, Marcus Tullius Cicero,
declared that "in the midst of arms, law stands mute." As a result of what we are
doing here today, there is real hope that that bleak statement will be less true in the
future than it has been in the past.
Podgers, supranote 53, at 69. However, Cicero made this statement while defending Titus
Annius Milo in a criminal prosecution for the murder of Publius Clodius Pulcher. See
MICHAEL GRANT, SELECTED POLITICAL SPEECHES OF CICERO

215 (1989). When taken in its

proper immediate context, it is clear that Cicero was explaining that all persons have an
inherent right of self-defense or, at least, the right to be charged with justifiable homicide
rather than murder. When one is being attacked with weapons in a lawless fashion, one is
not expected to obey the general prohibition against killing a fellow human being, but rather
is entitled to take up arms oneself; doing such is permissible because one's primary
motivation is not to kill the attacker, but rather to prevent one's self from being unlawfully
killed: one need not wait to be harmed before defending one's self. Thus, Cicero's reasoning
with respect to an individual's right of self-defense is applicable to and reinforcing of the
Nuremberg Charter's sanction of the initiation and/or waging of a defensive war.
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 7.
68. NUREMBERG RECORD, supra note 51, at 16.
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have subject matter jurisdiction in order to prosecute the action.
example,

For

[t]he crime of aggression, despite its recognition in the ILC draft
codes, was not invoked by the Security Council even in such an
obvious case as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and it is seldom
invoked in international practice. Yet, it was the United States,
and especially Justice Jackson, who insisted on criminalizing
war of aggression in the Nuremberg Charter and subsequent
proceedings, clearly viewing this crime as one for which
responsibility attaches to individuals.6 9

An international response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait based upon the illegal
use of aggression would have strengthened the international ban on its use.
Instead, the international community skirted the issue by invoking the
principle of the right to collective self-defense.
In explaining the element of "initiation," the Nuremberg Tribunal stated
that Germany's initiation of aggression was "a deliberate and essential part
of Nazi foreign policy," "premeditated," and "carefully prepared," and not
an accident "arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe and
the world."7 The aim of the initiation of aggressive war is destabilization,
rather than the preservation of regional or international order. Such
destabilization is often manifested in the form of territorial expansion.71
Although it may be true that the concepts of "initiation" and

69. Meron, supra note 42, at 107, 112.
70. NUREMBERG RECORD, supra note 51, at 16.
71. Adolph Hitler states in Mein Kampf "The soil on which we now live was not a gift
bestowed by Heaven on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking their lives. So
also in the future, our people will not obtain territory, and therewith the means of existence,
as a favor from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant
sword." Id. at 17 (quoting Mein Kampi). Patricia McKeon argues that the standard by which
"serious violations" of international law are to be measured is uncertain, stating that "[e]ven
Adolf Hitler was not prepared to publicly defend [against a charge ot aggressive war."
Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of
Sovereignty Against Demandsfor InternationalJustice, 12 ST. JOHN' S J. LEGAL COMMENT
535, 564, n.71 (1997) (citing Bernard D. Meltzer, "War Crimes ": The Nuremberg Trial and
the Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 895, 899 (1996)).
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"destabilization" may be
in the eye of the victor, 72 "war need not be waged
73
manner.,
in a criminal
Having distinguished between the initiation of aggressive war and the
waging of a defensive war, the Nuremberg Tribunal also made clear its
identity as a military tribunal. The Tribunal only prosecuted acts committed
during the war period, i.e., after September 1, 1939.14 Thus, all acts
committed in furtherance of Germany's aggressive war were within the
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal.75 But pre-conflict war crimes were
outside the scope of the Nuremberg Tribunal's jurisdiction (although
aggressive acts committed before this date were used for evidentiary
purposes to prove war crimes that were committed during the war period).7 6

72. See Robert H. Jackson, Representative and Chief Counsel for the United States of
America, Opening Address for the United States of America at the Trial of War Criminals
at Nuremberg, at 3-4 (1944) ("Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both
prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes .... Either the
victors must judge the vanquished or we must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After
the futility of the First World War, we learned the futility of the latter course."); Theodor
Meron, Editorial Comment, War Crimesin Yugoslavia and the Development ofInternational
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 87 n.1 (1994) (noting that some commentators regard the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals as "victors' courts").
73. HARRIS, supra note 31, at 502.
74. See id. at 512
75. See id.
76. See id.at 512-23. See alsoAMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ESTABLISHINGA JUST, FAIR, AND
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

14 (1994) (arguing that "[a]lthough the

International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) interpreted its jurisdiction under the
Nuremberg Charter not to extend to crimes against humanity unless they were committed in
execution of or in connection with a crime against peace or a war crime, nothing in the
judgment of that court should be read to suggest that crimes against humanity in other
circumstances were not prohibited under international law"); Meron, supra note 67, at 85
(discussing the relationship between the law to be applied by the ICC and the current state
of international law with respect to acts committed with and without a nexus to war; "neither
in the literature nor in the work of the ILC can one find consistent positions on the nexus
requirement") (sources cited therein); Allied Control Council Law No.10 (20 Dec. 1945)
(forming the jurisdictional basis for war crimes trials in Germany after the Nuremberg
Tribunal and defining "Crimes against Humanity" as "[a]trocities and offenses, including but
not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape,
or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the
country where perpetrated"); U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3(1) of 13 February 1946
(adopting the Nuremberg Tribunal's definition of crimes against humanity); U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 95(1) of 11 December 1946 (same); but see International Law
Commission, Draft Code of Offenses Against Peace and Security of Mankind, 28 July 1954,
U.N. Doc. A/2673 (1954) (reproduced in Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its thirty-seventh session, 6 May-26 July 1985, para. 18) (stating that war crimes
or crimes against humanity do not have to be committed in time of war); Report of the
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In addition, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the
nations waging a defensive war, i.e., the Allied Powers, were not actionable
under the Nuremberg Charter.77 While such crimes were by no means
sanctioned by the Nuremberg Charter, only crimes committed during the
waging of an aggressive war could be reached by the Nuremberg Tribunal."
Thus, the tribunal considered aggression and war crimes to be analytically
distinct: one could be present without the other. However, especially in the
case of war crimes and crimes against humanity, this distinction can be
arbitrary because such crimes can be "the most difficult for a party to a
conflict to give the appearance of trying fairly and impartially."7 9 As one
commentator noted, "the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials have been criticized
for lacking impartiality and due process, and because similar crimes by the
victorious forces went unpunished."8 ° For this reason, "[o]nly a truly
international court can ensure fairness in the trial of war related crimes."'"

International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, 29 April-19 July 1991,
U.N. Doc. A/46/10, para. 176 (same); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (same); International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid (same); Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Article 1(a) (same). The Statutes
for the International War Crimes Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda also allow for jurisdiction regardless of whether there is
an ongoing war. U.N. Doc. S/25704, para.47; Commission on Experts on Rwanda,
Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance
with Security Council Resolution 935, at 26-27 (29 Sept. 1994). "A majority of delegations,
including the United States, also appear to have rejected the nexus between crimes against
humanity and an armed conflict, as was required in the definition in the Nuremberg Tribunal
Charter." 1998 Recommendation, supra note 3, at 10 (citing Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Coiirt U.N. GAOR, 5!stsess.,
Supp. No. 22, Vols. 1 & 2, U.N. Doc. A/51/22, paras.85-90 (1996)); Hall, supra note 2, at
180. See also Crawford, supra note 2, at 407 ("The two previous occasions when criminal
trials were held at the international level, those at Nuremberg and Tokyo, followed the
unconditional surrender of a defeated enemy and constituted no precedent for a general and
permanent court operating in conditions of peace.") (internal quotations marked omitted).
The position of the United States is that no war nexus is required for crimes against
humanity. See Scheffer, supra note 15, at 14.
77. See HARRIS, supra note 31, at 556.
78. See id.
79. BRYAN F. MACPHERSON, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: APPLYING WORLD LAW
TO INDIVIDUALS

33 (1992)

80. Id.
81. See id. (stating that such a "true" international criminal court could serve a valuable
purpose in the international community even if it were established in the absence of an
international criminal code, in which case subject matter jurisdiction over crimes could be
conferred by the statute itself or by its separate protocols). Criticism of the procedure by
which the Nuremberg trials were conducted must be viewed in the light of Justice Jackson's
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In a passage prescient of some of the problems that accompanied the
establishment of the ICC, Whitney R. Harris, a member of the prosecution
team for the United States at the Nuremberg Trial, argued:
If the [Nuremberg] Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction to try
persons under international law for crimes committed by them
which were not related to war it would have wholly disregarded
the concept of sovereignty and subjected to criminal prosecution
under international law individuals whose conduct was lawful
Such
under controlling municipal law in times of peace.
jurisdiction should never be assumed by an ad hoc military
tribunalestablished to adjudicate crimes of war."
However, a permanent court would be justified in assuming such
jurisdiction because it could apply its standards of behavior to all
individuals over an extended period of time, thus mitigating the problem of
selectivity in prosecution. Moreover, in times of peace, such a court can
assert customary international law as defined in a multinational treaty. In
doing so, the court will serve as a prophylactic measure to prevent relatively
minor conflicts, even intrastate occurrences, from escalating into full-scale,
interstate war.
Given the common consensus that, whatever the general definition of
initiating and/or waging aggressive war8 3 the acts of Nazi Germany

opening admonitions:
Before I discuss the particulars of evidence, some general considerations which
may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world should be candidly faced.
There is a dramatic disparity between the circumstances of the accusers and of the
accused that might discredit our work if we should falter, in even minor matters,
in being fair and temperate.... We must never forget that the record on which we
judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow.
To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We
must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial
will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice.
Robert H. Jackson, Representative and Chief Counsel for the United States of America,
Opening Address for the United States of America at the Trial of War Criminals at
Nuremberg, at 3-4 (November 21, 1945).
82. HARRIS, supra note 31, at 512 (emphasis added).
83. The terms "war of aggression" and "aggressive war" are synonymous with the term,
"aggression." One commentator, reporting on the forty-seventh session of the International
Law Commission, observed that:
[i]t was suggested that the term "war of aggression," which was used at Nuremberg
and endorsed by the General Assembly, might be more appropriate [than the term
"aggression"] and would convey a sense of magnitude of the illegal use of force
commensurate with determining a use of force or aggression for which criminal
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definitely qualified, the Nuremberg Tribunal may be said to have skirted the
issue as to the actual definition. Furthermore, to guard against any charge
that the Nuremberg Charter was an ex post facto restraint placed upon the
Nuremberg defendants, the Nuremberg Tribunal proclaimed to do nothing
more than codify the law of nations up to that point in history.84 In one

commentator's view, "[t]he Nuremberg trial thus was a new legal process
by which effect was given to ancient principles ofjust and unjust behavior
in international affairs."85 Even before the Nuremberg proceedings, the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged the common law elements of war crimes.86
It stated further that Congress could "crystallize in permanent form and in
minute detail every offense against the law of war," should it decide to do
SO.87 The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of August 27, 1928
established the illegality of aggressive war as a means toward solving
diplomatic disputes and left defensive war as the only legal form of
aggression. 8
One possible general definition of aggressive war is the use of military
force as an instrument of advancing national policy. 9 Under this definition,
responsibility would be incurred and for which the necessary element of intent or
mens rea could be unmistakably inferred.... Jean Spiropoulos, the previous
special rapporteur on this topic, [reported] that "the notion of aggression is a notion
per se, a primary notion, which, by its very essence, is not susceptible of
definition."
Robert Rosenstock, CurrentDevelopment: The Forty-Seventh Session of the International
Law Commission, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 106, 110 (1996) (citing 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 69,
paras. 165, 166 (1951); UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/195 I/Add.1).
84. HARRIS, supra note 3 1, at 514-20.
85. Id. at 538.
86. See E, pa.e Quir-, 317 U.S. 1,47 (1942).
87. Id.
88. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. This
treaty, more commonly known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, allows a state
to determine for itself when it is being subjected to aggressive war and is entitled to defend
itself by means of defensive war. See HARRIS, supra note 31, at 520-21. This important
precursor to Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter provides:
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in
their relations with one another.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
Id.See also Resolution 3314, supranote 26, art. 5, para. 1 ("No consideration of whatever
nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for
aggression.").
89. HARRIS, supra note 31, at 521.

2000]

THE ICC AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

force used in self-defense could be considered an exception. A prerequisite
to the very concept of state sovereignty is the right for a country to defend
itself from an aggressor; if a state cannot legally defend itself, it cannot truly
be sovereign in any practical sense.9" The Nuremberg Tribunal also
anchored its use of the term "aggressive war" in other sources of
international law: Article One of the unratified 1923 draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance; 9' the preamble to the 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement

of International Disputes;92 the 1927 resolution of the Assembly of the
League of Nations;9 3 and the Sixth International Conference of American
States 94 in 1928. 9' These sources illustrate that the Nuremberg Tribunal was

not creating its definition from whole cloth, but from well-established
customary international law and international treaty law.96 From these

90. See id. at 521.

91. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 7, at 16 (1923) (providing that aggressive war
is an international crime).
92. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 23, at 498 (1924) (declaring that "a war of
aggression... is... an international crime").
93. LEAGUE OF NATIONS Resolution of 1927 (stating that "a war of aggression can never
serve as a means of settling international disputes, and is, in consequence, an international
crime").
94. Resolution of Sixth International Conference of American States, Feb. 20, 1928, 2
Bevans 730 (U.S.), 134 L.N.T.S. 45 (1928) (declaring in the preamble to a resolution against
aggression that "war of aggression constitutes a crime against the human species").
95. See also HARRIS, supra note 31, 523-24.
96. See generally,RESTATEMENT (THtRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (offering a legally deontological definition); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900) (holding that customary international law is U.S. law); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that customary international law is U.S. law);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Louis B.
Sohn, Making InternationalLaw More User-Friendly, Address to the United Nations
Congress on Public InternationalLaw, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, NEW YORK,

13-17 (1995); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.

Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense
About Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to ProfessorsBradley and Goldsmith, 66
FORD. L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International
Law as FederalLaw After Erie, 66 FORD. L. REV. 393 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P.
Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing:InternationalHuman Rights andFederalCommon Law, 66
FORD. L. REV. 463 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The CurrentIllegitimacy
of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation,66 FORD. L. REV. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourtsandthe IncorporationoflnternationalLaw,111 HARV.
L. REV. 2260 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism,

83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997) (stating concern that customary international law threatens
sovereignty of state court jurisdiction); see, e.g., The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
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sources, the Nuremberg Tribunal derived its authority to hold its defendants
criminally liable in their personal capacities for initiating and waging
Germany's war of aggression.9 7
III. STATE RESPONSIBILITY
War is nothing else than the continuation of state policy with
other means.... We see, therefore, that war is not merely a
politicalact but a realpoliticalinstrument, a continuationof
political
intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other
98
means.

Whereas the Allied powers adopted the Nuremberg Charter for a
specific situation, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314 "to
formulate basic principles" concerning whether an act of aggression has
been committed. 99 Resolution 3314 states that aggressive war "isa crime
against international peace . . . [and] gives rise to international
responsibility."' 00 Under Resolution 3314, "[aiggression is the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations."'0 1 In 1995, the American Bar Association's
Task Force on an International Criminal Court, speaking on behalf of the
International Law Practice Section of the American Bar Association, made
a recommendation

(1994): Torture Victim Protection Act of 199!, Pub. L.No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992);
Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HAST. INT'L
& COMp. L. REV. 445 (1995); William S. Dodge, The HistoricalOrigins of the Alien Tort
Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HAST. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 221 (1996);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995).
97. HARRIS, supra note 31, at 536-37 ("The initiating and waging of aggressive war is now
indisputably criminal. No more important decision was ever made by any court....
Nuremberg marked the transition of these wrongs from the moral to the legal plane.").
98. KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, VoM KRIEGE, cited in GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS
81 (1985); accordVLADIMIR ILYICH ULYANOV, 5 SELECTED WORKS, cited in SELDES, at 81.
Compare the following statement of Chinese Communist leader, Chou En-Lai: "All
diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means." Edgar Snow, Interview, SATURDAY
EVENING POST,March 27, 1954, cited in SELDES, at 78.
99. Resolution 3314, supra note 26, para. 10.
100. Id.art. 5(2). But cf Crawford, supranote 2, at 408 (observing choice of ILC to make
all criminal liability with respect to ICC individual liability as opposed to state-based
liability).
101. Resolution 3314, supra note 26, art. 1.
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against inclusion of the crime of "aggression," which is not
defined in any international convention. The only officially
adopted definition of aggression is that contained in General
Assembly Resolution 3314, adopted in 1974, which though
considered by many as a generally accepted interpretation of the
U.N. Charter, is considered by others as intended only as a
political guide and not a suitable definition for purposes of
prosecution. "'
Moreover, as a February 1998 recommendation of the American Bar
Association points out, "[t]he present consensus suggests that the initial
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC will be limited to the core crimes of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the recommendation
takes no position on the expansion of jurisdiction beyond the core
crimes.' 3 Similarly, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in its
recommendation against inclusion of the crime of aggression, contends that
Resolution 3314 "deals with aggression by states, not with the crimes of
individuals... [and] was intended as a guide for the Security Council, not
as a definition for judicial use."' 4
However, there are several reasons why Resolution 3314 is suitable as
a guide for a definition of the crime of aggression. First, it is analytically
misleading to separate the acts of individuals and the acts of states. States
do not act outside the scope of their citizens. The ICC will only punish
violations of the crimes under its subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of

individual responsibility.1 5 Therefore, the "acts of states" listed in
Resolution 331406 can be a guide for when the individuals in charge of a

state's actions have committed the acts required for a finding of aggression.
Just as a state can only acts through its citizens, it is unlikely that 07an
individual can wage aggressive war without the machinery of a state.1
Second, even if Resolution 3314 was not intended to be used in a judicial

102. Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, Report on
Improving the Effectiveness of the UnitedNations in Advancing the Rule ofLaw in the World,

29
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293, 303-4 (1995).

103. 1998 Recommendation, supranote 3 at 16 (1998). See also Report ofthe Preparatory
Committee on the Establishmentofan InternationalCriminalCourt, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 22, para. 107, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
104. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 6.
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 25.
106. Resolution 3314, supra note 26, art. 2.
107. For a discussion of aggression outside the context of a state, e.g., terrorism, see infra
Part V.
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setting, a proposition which is not entirely clear, it does phrase its
determinative criteria in legal language: "The first use of armed force by a
State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence
of an act of aggression.""1 8 Third, and perhaps most importantly, Resolution
3314 specifies acts that qualify as acts of aggression, much like a typical
penal statute.10 9 Finally, the Draft Statute, when delineating its own
definition of aggression, carefully drew upon the language of Resolution
3314.11 In addition, the Draft Statute's Option Three for the definition of
aggression,' " an option favored by the United States, draws on the language
of Resolution 3314 and adds the requirement that the accused be one "who
is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing the political or
military action of a State.""' 2 Although this definition commingled some of
the specific elements of Resolution 3314 and the principle of individual
responsibility of the Nuremberg Charter, it was omitted from the Rome
Statute during the Rome Conference along with Options One and Two.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ICC's EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Because situations wherein the crime of aggression arises are
intertwined with the maintenance of international peace and security, it is

rational that the Rome Statute provide for the interaction between the ICC
and the Security Council." 3 The provisions dealing with this issue have

108. Resolution 3314, supra note 26, art. 2.
109. See id arts. ! & 3.
110. See infra Appendix A.
111. Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 5.
112. Id. See also Scheffer, supra note 15, at 14; Daniel J. Brown, Note, The International
CriminalCourtand Trial in Absentia, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 763, 795 n. 184 (1999) (citing
Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations ofDavidJ.Scheffer, Ambassadorat-Large for war crimes issues and head of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference on the Establishmentof a PermanentInternationalCriminalCourt,
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 23, 1998); reporting that "Scheffer attributes the U.S.
delegation's failure to support the July 17 draft in Rome to unresolved jurisdictional
concerns, the definition of the crime of aggression, and provisions allowing the ICC
Prosecutor to unilaterally commence investigations with the consent of two judges"
(emphasis added)).
113. See Sienho Yee, Comment, A Proposalto Reformulate Article 23 of the ILC Draft
Statutefor an InternationalCriminalCourt, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 529 (1995).
See also Lara A. Ballard, Content: The Recognition and Enforcement of International
CriminalCourtJudgments in U.S. Courts, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 213 (1997)
(endorsing "[a]n official relationship of some sort" between the ICC and the Security
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undergone numerous revisions. Part IV of this Article strives not to
catalogue the minute details of the transformations that the definition has
undergone, but instead to trace the elements that are pertinent to a future
inclusion of the crime of aggression and the elements that eventually were
incorporated into the Rome Statute. Article 23 of the 1994 Draft has
received little attention due to the fact that the crime of aggression is
presently undefined and excluded from the Rome Statute.
A. The 1994 Draft Statute

Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter defines the Security
Council's central role in the maintenance of international peace and
security." 4 Because of this role, an examination of Article 23 of the 1994
Draft Statute, which details the relationship between the ICC and the
Security Council, is essential to the definition of the crime of aggression
within the Rome Statute. Under Article 23(1) of 1994 Draft Statute, the
Security Council was authorized to refer to the Prosecutor of the ICC a
"matter," but not individual cases naming specific people." 5 The Prosecutor
still had discretion to decide whether certain people should be charged in
connection with the referred "matter." ' 16 The American Bar Association's
1994 Recommendation contended that the "mandatory jurisdiction" of the
ICC could be summoned by the Security Council pursuant to its Chapter
Seven authority." 7

Council, but voicing concern that "allowing the United States and other permanent Security
Council members... complete hegemony over the ICC might be a bad idea for the world
community"); Crawford, supra note 3, at 411 (noting that, although "[t]he Commission...
took the view (consistently with the Nuremberg Charter) that there exists a crime of
aggression giving rise to individual responsibility ...[and that] proceedings in relation to
aggression may only be brought where the Security Council in the exercise of its chapter VII
powers has first determined that an act of aggression has been committed by a state," the
Security Council has in fact never made a determination that a state has committed an act of
aggression!).
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.
115. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 3, art. 23(1).
116. See Amnesty International, supranote 76, at 22 (suggesting that the word "normally"
in the commentary be deleted so that Security Council could never submit individual cases,
but only generalized situations, to ICC so that prosecutorial discretion of Prosecutor, and thus
integrity of the Court, itself, not be eroded). See also 1998 Recommendation, supra note 3,
at 13-14.
117. See 1998 Recommendation, supra note 2, at 15 (citing 1994 Recommendation, supra
note 2, at 300). See also Stuart H. Deming, Symposium, Hot Spots in InternationalLaw:
War CrimesandinternationalCriminalLaw,28 AKRON L. REv. 421,423 n. 14 (1995) (citing
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The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights endorsed this provision,
pointing out the administrative efficiency that it would create. 18 Instead of
having to create an ad hoc tribunal every time the international community
needed to pursue justice in a particular matter, the Security Council could
simply make a referral to the ICC." 9 In addition, under Article 23(2), "[a]
complaint of or directly related to an act of aggression may not be brought
under the Statute unless the Security Council has first determined that a
the act of aggression which is the subject of the
State has committed
2
complaint."'
Under Article 23(3), "[n]o prosecution may be commenced under this
Statute arising from a situation being dealt with by the Security Council as
a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII
of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides."' 2 ' Thus the
Security Council could have vetoed any state's complaints against
individuals of another state who were committing acts of aggression against
it. 12 2 Because many of the crimes that are within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC occur during times of aggression, the Security
Council would have had the ability under Article 23 to exclude the ICC not

the 1994 Recommendation and noting that the Clinton administration seems to favor the
narrowing of the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC). See generally Remarks at the
University of Connecticut, PUB. PAPERS 1595 (1995); Remarks Prior to a Meeting With
Military Leaders and an Exchange With Reporters in Arlington, Virginia, PUB. PAPERS 96
(1997); Remarks to the 52nd Session of the UnitedNations General Assembly in New York
City, PUB. PAPERS 1205 (1997); Remarks in New York City Commemorating the 50th
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, PUB. PAPERS 1731 (1997);
Remarks on the Peace Process in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters, PUB. PAPERS
1793 (1997): Remarks to Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda, DUB. PAPERS 431 (1998).
118. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 7, at 19.
119. See id.
120. Draft Statute, supranote 14, art. 23(2).
121. Id. art. 23(3).
122. Amnesty International, supra note 76, at 21-22. See Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft
Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind: Eating Disorders at the
InternationalLaw Commission, 8 CaM. L.F. 43, 59 (1997) (noting that "the linkage of the
individual crime with aggression committed by a state means that a court faced with the trial
of an individual for aggression can proceed with that trial only if a determination has been
made by the Security Council that aggression has been committed by a state"). Rayfuse also
points out:
There is little real guidance in either General Assembly Resolution 3314 or the UN
Charter to assist a domestic court in determining whether aggression has occurred
and, if left to the custom and practice of the United Nations to give substance to the
text, the issue will forever be clouded by the political imperatives of the permanent
Security Council members and their veto power.
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only from exercising jurisdiction over acts of aggression, but also over the
other core2' crimes that are committed in connection with the overall
"matter."' This situation is similar to one in which a court refrains from
deciding a certain issue on the basis that it is a political question or
otherwise not ripe for judicial determination. The commentary to Article
23(3) points out that the Security Council should take affirmative steps to
resolve the situation in order to properly justify the ICC's "abstention.' 24
However, some have argued that the Security Council could prevent the ICC
from entertaining a matter "by merely placing an item on its own agenda
and dealing with the matter itself."' 125 Amnesty International endorsed the
Article 23 approach, stating that its referral system augments the
effectiveness of the ICC because it offsets the requirements for state consent
put forth in Articles 21 and 53.126 Another advantage of Article 23 is that
the Security Council can refer to the ICC a "matter" involving a grave
human rights situation in a state that was not a party to the Statute or one
that was a party to the Statute, but had not yet consented to27the subject
matter jurisdiction pertaining to the particular alleged crime. 1
B. The Draft Statute
As Ambassador Scheffer indicated, the Draft Statute provides: (1) "that
the Security Council should determine whether cases that pertain to its
functions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be considered by the
ICC";128 (2) "that the Security Council must act before any alleged crime of
aggression can be prosecuted against an individual"; 129 and (3) "that the
prosecutor should act only in cases referred either by a state party to the
treaty or by the Council."' 30 Article 10(7) of the Draft Statute provides that
no prosecution is to be commenced (including a prosecution for the crime
of aggression) where the Security Council is exercising its Chapter Seven
authority, unless the Security Council waives or consents.31 A further
123. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 6.
124. Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 23(3). See also Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, supra note 6, at 17.
125. See, e.g., Yee, supra note 113, at 530.
126. Amnesty International, supra note 76, at 21.
127. See id. (noting, however, that the political nature of the Security Council would most
likely prevent it from submitting every such matter to the ICC).
128. Scheffer, supra note 15, at 13.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 10(7), Options I & 2. See also 1998

440

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 19

option provides that the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression until the Security Council has made a determination that an
act of aggression has occurred."' The American Bar Association's 1998
Recommendation states that, because the Security Council is charged with
the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council

"should be authorized to initiate proceedings before the ICC."'33 Such a

scheme entails the risk of shifting the focus of the ICC from an impartial
legal institution to a naked political body. Should one of the five permanent
members of the Security Council want to veto a finding of aggression, that
member would be able to block any ICC action, and an "accused" member
of the Security Council could effectively thwart any adverse ICC action.
This is similar to the present system of compulsory jurisdiction used in the
International Court of Justice, a system that has hampered both the
functioning and the institutional integrity of International Court of Justice.134
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has expressed reservations
concerning the role of the Security Council in the ICC's trigger mechanism:
As an independent and impartial body, the Court should be free
from pressure or involvement by the Security Council or any other
political body. The competence of the Security Council to
maintain and restore international peace and security does not
conflict with the need to ensure international justice. The Court's

Recommendation, supra note 2, at 15.
132. See Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 10(4), Option 1.
133. 1998 Recommendation, supra note 2, at 14. See Ballard, supra note 17, at 219 n.28
(noting that no provision in the United Nations Charter "regards aggression as a criminal
offense for which individuals can be held accountable, nor do any other provisions of any
treaties or other agreements currently in existence").
134. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 76, at 17-2; Rome Statute, supra note 25,
pt. 2., Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, Article 17 (issues of admissibility),
Article 18 (preliminary rulings regarding admissibility), Article 19 (challenges to the
jurisdiction of the court of the admissibility of a case); Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27) (concerning military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua; judgment on merits). But see Meron, supranote 69, at,
80-81:
In Nicaragua... the International Court of Justice contrasted the conflict between
the contras and the Sandinista Government with that between the United States and
Nicaragua. The first, as internal, was governed by common Article 3 [of the
Geneva Conventions] only, the second, as international, fell under the rules on
international conflicts. Iam not suggesting any parallels between the parties to the
conflicts in Nicaragua and in the former Yugoslavia and would simply submit that
any attempt to apply the Nicaragua Court's distinctions to the conflict in
Yugoslavia would result in byzantine complexity, making prosecutions difficult and
often impossible.
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proceeding in a given case should therefore not be subject to
Security Council approval, nor should the Security Council be able
to delay or block investigations or prosecutions when crimes
within the Court's jurisdiction arise from a situation being dealt
with by the Security Council. 35

The Prosecutor can achieve such independence by using her discretionary
power to bring a complaint before the Court, especially in a situation where
the states or the Security Council refuse to file a complaint. 3 6 The ICC's
institutional integrity could be eroded should the Security Council influence
the Prosecutor's discretion to the extent that indictments appear to be
selective, as in the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and

Rwanda.13 7 The Chief Prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia has stated that the political process of the
Security Council and the judicial process of the Tribunal are meant to be
independent processes. Rather than the Tribunal being attuned to the
happenings of the Security Council, the Security Council should be attuned
to the work of the Tribunal during the judicial process.138 Evidence for this

135. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Basic Principles for an Independent and
Effective International Criminal Court, at Introduction (May 1998). The Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights also expressed its reservations over any requirement that the Security
Council declare that an act of aggression has occurred before the ICC could take jurisdiction
over a "matter" by pointing out:
If the ICC cannot rule on individual responsibility unless that condition is fulfilled,
the question arises as to whether the court could find an individual not guilty
regardless of the Council's determination that aggression was involved. If it could
not do so, the court would obviously be subject to the political will of the Security
Council, an outcome detrimental both to its integrity and to the due process rights
of defendants.
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supranote 6.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Interview with Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the United Nations International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, CNN
(May 27, 1999) (responding to questions after having indicted the President of Yugoslavia
on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity). Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic now has the infamous honor of being the first head of state to be indicted by an
international judicial body. William Pace, Convenor of the Coalition for an International
Criminal Court, in response to the indictment, rejects "the idea that advancing international
justice hinders the development of peace. The only settlement to the current crisis in
Yugoslavia which will bring lasting peace is one in which justice plays a fundamental role."
Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Press Release, Milosevic Indictment
Underscores Urgency of Completing Establishment of Permanent InternationalCriminal
Court (visited May 27, 1999) <http://www.igc.org/icc/html/pressrelease19990527.html>.
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view is that the Security Council created the Tribunal in 1993 at a time
39
when the war was still raging in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1
C. The Rome Statute

Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that "[n]o investigation or
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with ... for a period of 12

months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that
effect.""14 This final "resolution" of the relationship between the Security
Council and the ICC has the potential to undermine the credibility and
judicial independence of the ICC. However, because a Security Council
resolution must be issued and such resolutions must be unanimous, a single
member of the Security Council will not be able to prevent the ICC from
taking jurisdiction over a particular matter. 4 '

The United States has

expressed its opposition to the Article 15 authorization of the Prosecutor "to
initiate investigations and prosecutions of crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the court, in the absence of a referral of an overall
situation
142
by either a state party to the treaty or the Security Council."'
Although the Rome Statute did not define the crime of aggression, it
included instructions that the definition be provided through the amendment
process of Articles 121 and 123. As a result, the relationship of the Security
Council to the ICC will continue to be an important issue: when the crime
139. See Arbour Interview, supra note 139.
140. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16.
141. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
142. Scheffer, supra note 15, at 12, 13, 18 ("Under Article 12, the ICC may exercise such
jurisdiction over anyone anywhere in the world, even in the absence of a referral by the
Security Council, if either the state or the territory where the crime was committed or the
state of the nationality of the accused consents. Ironically, the treaty exposes non-parties in
ways that parties are not exposed ....
It is simply and logically untenable to expose the
largest deployed military force in the world, stationed across the globe to help maintain
international peace and security and to defend U.S. allies and friends, to the jurisdiction of
a criminal court the U.S. Government has not yet joined and whose authority over U.S.
citizens the United States does not yet recognize."); Statement of the United States
Delegation to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court (Mar. 23, 1998), reprintedin Hearing Before Subcomm. on International Operations
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Is a U.N. InternationalCriminal Court in the
U.S. NationalInterest? The Concerns of the United States Regarding the Proposalfor a
Proprio Motu Prosecutor, 105th Cong. 129 (1998). Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute
enables the Security Council to refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more of
the core crimes have been committed. See Rome Statute, supra note 25, art. 13(b). Article
14(1 ) does the same with respect to a state party. See id art. 14(J).
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of aggression is defined, it will still be within the scope of the Security
Council's authority to pass a resolution blocking the ICC's exercise of
jurisdiction over the crime in a specific "matter." Also, the "opt-out"
provision allows a country to remove its own citizens from exposure to
liability with respect to certain crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
(except the crime of genocide for which jurisdiction is automatic). 43 The
United States is concerned that such a country could refer a matter involving
American citizens who have committed crimes against humanity and war
crimes while at the same time shielding its own citizens from the self-same
crime. 144 Similarly, the United States argues that the exercise ofjurisdiction
under Article 12 creates disincentives for countries undertaking military
their soldiers
actions on humanitarian and human rights grounds because
45
may be subject to prosecution under the Rome Statute. 1
V. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[I]n all matters offuture endeavor, the best course ofactionfor
one who is recommending a model, which ought to be
attempted, is to leave undone no detail of absolute truth and
beauty. But if it turns out that one of these details is impossible
to realize, then one shouldput aside that particulardetail and
not attempt to put it into practice,and insteadcontrive in such
a manner as to implement whichever of the remaining details
comes closest to it and by its very nature is most akin to the
suitablepolicy. 146

143. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 19.
144. See Scheffer, supranote 15, at 19.
145. See id. Both these concerns, however, are red herrings and belie the United States'
continuing lack of commitment to compliance with international legal norms: the
precondition of these concerns is the expectation that American soldiers will commit one of
the core crimes. The focus of the United States should not be modification of the Rome
Statute so that it is less able to insure justice, but rather to train its soldiers to insure that they
will not commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
146. PLATO, THE LAWS 5.746b.5-5.746c.4 (loannes Burnet, Platonis Opera, Scriptorum
Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, Tomus V, Tetralogiam IX Definitiones Et Spuria
Continens, Pars 1) (translation of the author). Accord Ballard, supra note 113, at 143, 219
(1997) ("If the ICC's requests are refused and its decisions disregarded, it will erode the
credibility of not only the ICC treaty, but also of treaties in general and, most importantly,
of international law itself. If, on the other hand, the ICC is willing to trade just a bit of its
nobility for a dose of reality, the world stands to gain a substantial asset .... ").
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A. Problems

1. Acts of Aggression by Non-State Actors
A potential shortcoming of the definition of aggression proposed in the
Draft Statute is the lack of provision for acts of aggression committed by
individuals who are not officially affiliated with a state entity. Because an
act of aggression is defined in the Draft Statute as an act of one state against
another state, "[i]n the absence of the recognized involvement of a state, no
'
individual can be tried for such crimes."147
Furthermore, although Article
5, Option 2, Section 2(g) of the Draft Statute provides for "[t]he sending by
or on behalfof a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State,"' 48 such acts still
must be orchestrated by a state. 4 9 Thus, terrorist and revolutionary groups

can plan, initiate, and wage aggressive war with impunity. 5 ° Any deterrent
effect of the ICC will not apply to the individual members of these non-state
groups because they need not fear prosecution by the ICC.
2. The Legal Sufficiency of Resolution 3314
The American Bar Association's 1998 Recommendation points out that
there is no definition for the crime of aggression sufficient to support the
finding of individual criminal liability. 5 ' Even if true with respect to the
definition of aggression contained within Resolution 3314, this is certainly
not true with respect to the Nuremberg Charter. As previously discussed,
the jurisprudential challenge of defining the crime of aggression was met in
the Nuremberg Charter. 5 2 Moreover, the Rome Statute allows for the
referral of a "matter" to the Prosecutor, who then decides whether to nnrsue
an indictment. Thus, aggrieved states and the Security Council can use the
criteria set forth in Resolution 3314 to determine whether or not a "matter"
can be considered aggression. Thereafter, the Prosecutor can determine
whether the individuals responsible for the state's aggressive behavior are

147. Rayfuse, supra note 122, 58-60.
148. Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 3(g) (emphasis added).
149. See generally Rayfuse, supra note 122, at 59, 60 n.55.
150. For example, the attack on Benin by mercenaries in 1977 which the Security Council
condemned "as aggression but declined to name a responsible state" and "the coup.., in the
Comoros Islands in 1995" that was conducted by mercenaries purporting not to act on the
behalf of any particular state. See Rayfuse, supra note 122, at 59.
151. 1998 Recommendation, supra note 2, at 17-18.
152. See infra Part II.A.2.
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subject to personal and individual liability based on the principles of the
Nuremberg Charter under the assumption that a state can act only through
its individualized citizenry.
Another fact suggests another problem: "no court has ever prosecuted
an individual for the crime of aggression other than at Nuremberg and
Tokyo." 53' This lack ofjudicial precedent gives rise to the possibility that
an individual may be tried and convicted of a crime that has not been fully
developed. 54 Whitney Harris has observed that the crime of aggression
should be made specific and... efforts should continue to define
aggressive war more effectively. These and other positive
statements of law can bring the Nuremberg principles out of the
relatively vague area of the common law of crimes and into the
more easily understandable and applicable reaches of written

law. 155
Article 22 of the Rome Statute guards against a prosecution based on vague
law by laying out clear standards for the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege: "a person shall not be criminally responsible under this statute unless
the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within
thejurisdiction of the Court.' 56 Furthermore, no vagueness in the definition
of a crime is tolerated, so that any future definition of the crime of

153. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Jan. 19, 1946),
amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
154. 1998 Recommendation, supra note 2, at 17-18. "Among the key events [toward the
establishment of an ICC] was a landmark decision by an Appeals Chamber [of the
International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] in October 1995 that clarified
the rules of international criminal law relating to the role and jurisdiction of the tribunal."
Id. at 4 (citing Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, paras. 129, 134, 137
(int'l Trib. Yugo. App. Ch., Oct. 2, 1995) (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction) (35 I.L.M. 32)). "It was followed in May 1997 by the Tadic
judgment, the first judgment by an international criminal tribunal since the Nuremberg and
Tokyo verdicts following World War II." Id. Article 39 of the 1994 Draft Statute provides:
An accused shall not be held guilty:
(a) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred to in
article 20(a) to (d), unless the act or omission in question constituted a
crime under international law;
(b) in the case of a prosecution with respect to a crime referred to in
article 20(e), unless the treaty in question was applicable to the conduct
of the accused;
at the time the act or omission occurred.
1994 Draft Statute, supra note 14, art. 39.
155. HARRiS, supra note 31, at 564.
156. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 22(1).
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aggression is required to "be strictly construed and shall not extend by
analogy. In the case of ambiguity, the definition shall be construed in favor
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted."15' 7 The listed acts
in Resolution 3314 are well-suited to this task.
3. The Cost of Inclusion
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, which identified the
determination of the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction as the most important
issue, has argued that an initial restriction of the court's jurisdiction would
facilitate broader acceptance of the ICC and enhance its credibility and
authority.' 58 In light of the fact that individual states can be "punished" by
the Security Council under its Chapter Seven authority,"' some have argued
that the crime of aggression is superfluous, because individual state leaders
guilty of waging aggressive war are also likely to be guilty of committing
one of the other, well-defined core crimes. 6 ' However, such a theory does
not take into account the value of the criminalization of the aggression itself.
The international community has made great progress during the twentieth
century in expressing its disapproval of war as a means of solving
international disputes. As one commentator has stated,
[t]he crime of aggression-the crime of crimes-should be part of
the jurisdiction of the Court.
Otherwise, the diplomatic
conference for the establishment of an International Court would

157. Id.art. 22(2).
158. Law.yers Comi.e. fr Human Rights, supru note 6. ("it would also avoid
overloading the court with cases that can be adequately dealt with at the national level and
would ease the costs of starting up a new international institution."). The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights also endorses the concept of allowing the state parties to
amend the Rome Statute in order to add additional international crimes to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC. Id. See also Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Criminal Law, Appendix A: Draft Statutefor an InternationalCriminal Court, Suggested
Modifications to the 1994 ILC-Draft (Siracusa-Draft)Preparedby A Committee ofExperts,
38 SANTA CLARA L. REV.751, 771-72 (1998). See Rayfuse, supra note 122, at 43, 54 (1997)
(discussing the subject matterjurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression and noting
that such jurisdiction "is one of the most contentious issues in the current discussions aimed
at finalizing the Statute and bringing the court into existence").
159. See Patricia A. McKeon, Note, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the
PrincipleofSovereignty Against Demandsfor InternationalJustice, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 535, 564, n.70 (1997) (arguing that the crime of aggression is not susceptible to
definition and that, although aggression has sometimes been applied to the acts of states, it
has largely been ignored with respect to the acts of individuals).
160. See id. at 564.
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bear, in the annals of human history, the stigma of making
retrogressive development of international law. The current
proposal would only empower the Court to remedy minor
symptoms, rather than enable it to eliminate one of the primary
causes of breaches of international peace and security-the crime
of aggression. 161
Aggressive war itself can lead to other core crimes, thus the initial
prevention of war could accelerate compliance with other international law.
B. Recommendations
1. A Definition for the Crime of Aggression
First, the specific acts enumerated in Resolution 3314 constituting the
crime of aggression should be retained as the basis for the definition of the
crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. Resolution 3314 "[c]alls the
attention of the Security Council to the Definition of Aggression... and
recommends that it should, as appropriate, take account of that Definition
as guidance in determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence
of an act of aggression."' 162 Such guidance to the Security Council does not
transform the criteria of Resolution 3314 into a purely political device. The
particular acts listed in Resolution 3314 can inform the Security Council and
still serve as a judicial definition of what constitutes the initiation and/or
waging of an aggressive war. Indeed, there is no other way to statutorily
create or codify a crime than by listing the specific actions that constitute
the perpetration of that crime. 163 As with the other core crimes, the acts
constituting the crime of aggression have been described in detail in order
to bring feasibility and transparency to the crime of aggression.
Second, the emphasis on individual responsibility contained within the
Nuremberg Charter should be retained and applied to the specific acts of
aggression referred to above. The specifics of the definition and the
principle that state acts are committed by state agents are not mutually
exclusive elements of the definition of the crime of aggression. Not only do
these two aspects of the definition complement each other, they actually
depend upon one another in order to form a comprehensive and applicable
definition of the crime. Finally, all acts of aggression, not just those
161. Yee, supra note 122, at 530, 531.
162. Resolution Adopted By The GeneralAssembly. U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 29th Sess.,
2319th mtg., para. 4, U.N. DOC.A/RES./(XXIX)(1975).
163. See infra Appendix A.
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committed by individuals on the behalf of states, should be encompassed
within the definition.
2. Security Council Participation in the ICC
Should the crime of aggression be defined in accordance with the above
recommendation, the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression should be unambiguously independent of the Security Council's
authority to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council
should be able to refer matters involving aggression to the ICC, but there
should be no consent or approval requirement to interfere with the discretion
of the ICC Prosecutor. If the Security Council has stated by means of a
resolution that it is acting to combat the use of aggression by a state or nonstate entity, then the ICC may consider staying its proceeding pending the
completion of the Security Council's activities. But the ICC should be
under no formal obligation to do so. 1 6 4

164. See Ballard, supra note 113, at 143, 214 (suggesting (1) approval of prosecution by
majority vote of Security Council instead of allowing one member of Security Council to use
its veto power; (2) referral of matters by Security Council to ICC, but exclusion of Security
Council from any other consent provisions; and (3) approval of Security Council only
required in prosecution for aggression). Another noteworthy proposal provides:
1. Notwithstanding article 2 1, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20 as a consequence of the
referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations. Such referral is not, however, binding on
either the Prosecutor or any Chamber of the Court with respect to whether there is
enough evidence for initiating an investigation or prosecution proceeding against
an individual or for individual responsibility.
2. The Security Council may, on its own motion or upon request by any interested
person or government, pardon, commute or reduce the sentence imposed by the
Court on a person convicted of the crime of(a) aggression, (b) threat of aggression,
or (c) a crime against the peace, if the interests of peace and justice so require.
Such action by the Security Council shall not have any effect on the conviction
itself.
3. The Court shall stay any judicial proceeding (other than investigative
operations) upon the request by the Security Council when it, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, concludes that such a stay is necessary as
part of its enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such a stay shall be lifted and the proceeding shall continue, however,
when:
(a) the Security Council notifies the Court that such a stay is no longer
necessary; or
(b) all relevant sanctions including both military and economic sanctions,
if any, imposed by the Security Council have been suspended or
terminated; or
(c) in the absence of active involvement of the Security Council, the
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VI. CONCLUSION

The above proposals will insure that the ICC is a credible legal
institution whose bite equals its bark, unlike many of the legal organs that
preceded it. Although compromise is always a necessary part of almost any
multilateral treaty, there are certain non-negotiable prerequisites to a court
of law without which there can be no legitimate exercise of force pursuant
to impartially applied legal principles.
The decision of the United States not to sign the Rome Statute conflicts
with the American Bar Association's 1998 Recommendation endorsing "a
continuing active role for the United States government in the process of
negotiating and drafting an ICC treaty."' 165 Countries that have not signed
the Rome Statute are unable to formally take part in the ongoing
negotiations that will shape important aspects of the treaty. Although the
United States "remains strongly committed to the achievement of
international justice," '66 the means by which it may realize this goal have
been curtailed.

Court decides that such a stay is no longer necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security, having given due regard to the
relevant actions and views of the Security Council.
Yee, supranote 113, at 531, 532.
165. 1998 Recommendation, supra note 2, at Ia.
166. Scheffer, supra note 15, at 22.
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Appendix A
The table below presents the texts of the Draft Statute and Resolution 3314
side by side in order display the proximity of the language:
The Draft Statute

Option 1
[For the purpose of the present
Statute, the crime [of aggression] [against
peace] means any of the following
committed by an individual [who is in a
position of exercising control or capable
of directing political/military action in a
State]:
(a) planning,
(b) preparing,
(c) ordering,
(d) initiating, or
(e) carrying out
[an armed attack] [the use of armed
force] [a war of aggression,] [a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing] by a State against
the [sovereigity,] territorial integrity [or
political independence] of another State
[when this] [armed attack] [use of force]
[is] [in contravention of the Charter of the
United Nations] [in contravention of the
Charter of the United Nations as
determined by the Security Council].]

Option 2
1. [For the purpose of this Statute,
the crime of aggression is committed by a
person who is in a position of exercising
control or capable of directing
political/military actions in his State,

against another State, in contravention to

Resolution 3314
Article 1
Aggression is the use of armed force
by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter
of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition....

Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless
of a declaration of war, shall, subject to
and in accordance with the provisions of
article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
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the Charter of the United Nations, by
Resorting to armed force, to threaten or
violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of that State.]
[2. [Acts constituting [aggression]
[armed attack] include the following:]
[Provided that the acts concerned or
their consequences are of sufficient
gravity, acts constituting aggression [are]
[included] the following:]
(a) the invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by
the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof;
(b) bombardment by the armed
forces of a State against the territory of
another State [, or the use of any weapons
by a State against the territory of another
State];
(c) the blockade of the ports or
coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) an attack by the armed forces or
[sic] a State on the land, sea or air forces,
or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) the use of armed forces of one
State which are within the territory of
another State in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement,
or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond their termination of the
agreement;
(f) the action of a State in allowing
its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by
that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;

(a) The invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the
use of force of the territory of another State
or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed
forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by
a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or
coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of
a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one
State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the
receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or
any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the
agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing
its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that
other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
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(g) the sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed
above, or its substantial involvement
therein.]

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.

Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its FortySixth Session, Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, art. 5,
Options 1 & 2, 49 U.N. GAOR, 49 Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (Sept.
1, 1994) (Option 3 omitted).

Resolution Adopted By The General
Assembly. 3314 (XXIX). Definition of
Aggression, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res./3314 (XXIX), Annex. Definition
of Aggression, Arts. 1 & 3 (Jan. 14, 1975)
(emphasis in original).

